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1 Introduction 
As the drive for foreign capital increases across the globe, the potential effects of these 
capital flows, including those from cross-border banking cannot be overlooked. In one 
vein, a more liberalised financial environment will lead to firms being more cautious 
when taking risk, when allocating resources and when making expenditures thereby 
ensuring efficiency and invariably growth (Gardener et al., 2011). In the other vein, 
increased financial globalisation will spur competition which will in turn lower profits 
(Wu et al., 2016). This dampening of profits can put firms at the risk of bankruptcy (Baik 
et al., 2011). Under these conditions, the jobs of managers are threatened and such 
pressured managers and firms have the incentive to manipulate accounts to make them 
look attractive to investors. Thus, pressured firms are more likely to manage earnings. 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.368), earnings management occurs “when 
managers use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers.” Avelé and Niyomahirwe (2016) have shown that the 
quality of accounting information of firms directly affects the preparation of accounting 
information according to the international financial reporting standards (IFRS). Indeed, 
earnings management has attracted the attention of not only researchers, but of 
practitioners and regulators as well (Kourdoumpalou, 2017). Earnings management has 
implications for the cost of debt and risk profile of banks. It has been shown that, firms 
that apply real earnings management techniques have a lower credit rating and a higher 
cost of debt at the time of issue (Crabtree et al., 2014). 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   242 M. Amidu et al.    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Yet so far, the link between cross-border banking and the quality of accounting 
information has been ignored in the global banking literature, and even more so in 
African banking studies. Some laudable attempts have been made recently to advance our 
understanding of the implications of cross-border banking but not necessarily the 
accounting informativeness of it. For instance, Sissy et al. (2017) advance the literature 
on the impact of cross-border banking on risk and return in the African banking industry; 
Agbloyor et al. (2012) assess the effects of cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) on banking sector development in Africa; Gulamhussen et al. (2016) examine 
the drivers of cross-border M&As among commercial banks; Figuet et al. (2015) 
investigate the effects of Basel III on cross-border banking claims; Léon (2016) studies 
the link between cross-border banking and competitive behaviour of banks while 
Kleimeier et al. (2013) assess the transmission of financial crises via cross-border 
banking.1 
Another research gap in the banking literature lies in the link between institutional 
factors and the quality of accounting information especially within the context of  
cross-border banking. The institutional superstructure is imperative for the compliance of 
firms to international accounting standards, because institutions define the rules of 
engagement. Ball et al. (2000) argue that, in an international context, it is inadequate and 
somewhat misleading to solely study accounting standards because the motivation to 
adopt such standards depends on the institutional framework which imposes and enforces 
punishments. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) have further stressed that the adoption of 
accounting standards does not guarantee the quality of observed reporting. Instead, the 
quality of reporting will depend on what they call ‘reporting incentives’ comprising firm 
level factors and the legal institutions of the country. This gap is what the paper is 
seeking to address. 
This paper advances the cross-border banking and quality of accounting information 
literature by investigating the effects of cross-border banking and institutional structures 
on the quality of accounting information of banks in Africa. In particular, we analyse two 
hypotheses. First, the earnings quality of banks improves as banks cross-border and 
national institutions get stronger. We argue that countries with strong institutions tend to 
have a free media, a more expressive citizenry, and transparent and accountable 
institutions. Consequently, countries with strong and stable political and governance 
structures are therefore, more likely to require foreign banks to be more compliant with 
and effective in their disclosures. Second, that cross-border banking, larger market share 
and the degree of transparency are the principal drivers of the relative quality of 
accounting information among African banks. We are not aware of any study testing 
these hypotheses either separately or concurrently, especially within the African banking 
industry. 
The contributions of this study to the literature are twofold, first, we shed light on the 
implications of cross-border banking for the quality of accounting information. Second, 
the study applies the institutional economics theory to earnings management within the 
purview of cross boarder banking, an area where the literature is scarce. System 
generalised method of moment (system GMM) is employed to address the endogeneity 
inherent in the relationship between institutions, cross-border banking and the quality of 
accounting information. Cross-border banking is measured as a dichotomous variable, 
taking the value 1, if the bank is controlled by a foreign shareholder and 0 otherwise, 
while institutional quality is proxied by a number of indicators including, transparency, 
law quality, bureaucratic quality and legislative strength. Dechow et al. (2010) consider 
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accounting information quality (AIQ) as a broad set with various dimensions among 
which persistence, conservatism and accounting earnings management stand out. On the 
basis of this, we employ accruals-based earnings management as a measure of AIQ. 
We organise the rest of the paper as follows: Section 2 reviews existing literature, 
Section 3 constructs various specifications of discretional accruals, as proxies for the 
AIQ, explains the four institutional quality indicators and other control variables and 
details the estimation methodology. Section 4 contains the empirical results and Section 5 
concludes. 
2 Related literature 
In this section, we review the theoretical literature that underpins the study. We begin 
with theoretical literature on institutional, agency and stakeholder theories and then 
discuss empirical literature on cross-border banking, institutional and AIQ. 
2.1 Theoretical background 
This paper is explained by three main theories: institutional theory, agency theory and 
stakeholder theory. From the perspective of economists “institutions are the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” [North, (1990), p.3]. From the sociological perspective, institutions 
are the “cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” [Scott, 
(2001), p.48]. Institutional theory predicts that because institutions dictate what is 
legitimate, they influence the actions of managers (Suchman, 1995). Therefore, managers 
and firms that take actions which deviate from institutionally prescribed norms risk losing 
legitimacy. These institutional factors may entail rules of law, professional groupings, 
government and civil society. One of the core principles of institutional theory is 
isomorphism (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), which is the proclivity for organisations to adopt 
similar practices, norms and procedures with the view to gaining legitimacy. Based on 
isomorphism, the adoption of a technology by a firm is influenced by three main factors 
beyond profit maximisation namely, mimetic, coercive, and normative factors. Mimetic 
pressures imposed by institutions cause firms in the same industry to deliberately copy 
and imitate the practices and behaviours of others in response to uncertainty. Coercive 
factors lead an organisation to adopt certain practices due to pressure brought on it by 
other organisations and or society. Normative institutional factors are at play when a firm 
indirectly adopts a norm or practice due to professionalization. So far, we can glean from 
institutional theory that AIQ will be high for cross-border banks operating in countries 
with standard institutions. 
The concept of institutional quality will apply to the case of cross-border banks. 
According to Hillman and Wan (2005), subsidiaries of multinational companies face twin 
institutional pressures, one from the host country and the other from the home country. In 
this regard, foreign firms owe it a responsibility to conform to host country institutional 
norms and practices in order to be accepted in the home country and to boost their 
performance (Suchman, 1995). The challenge however is that, home country institutions 
are ingrained in the culture, practices and norms of subsidiaries and are deemed critical to 
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their decision making (Shi et al., 2012). Thus, the concept of institutional duality makes 
the predictions of the effect of institutions on AIQ quite complicated. According to 
Kostova (1999), the impact of home country institutions on voluntary disclosure of 
subsidiary enterprises may be long lasting. On the contrary, Kim et al. (2016) show that, 
domestic institutions have a greater influence on foreign firm’s earnings management 
than home country institutions. 
Agency theory offers an alternative explanation as to why firms will disclose 
accounting information. Where there is high ownership concentration, controlling 
shareholders have more information about expected future earnings than minority 
shareholders leading to information asymmetry (Shi et al., 2012). Under this condition, 
more disclosure may entail higher monitoring costs for external stakeholders and higher 
reputational costs for the firm when disclosures are lopsided (Cumming and Walz, 2010). 
Agency theory predicts that majority shareholders will be unwilling to voluntarily 
disclose information when the benefits of private expropriation are high (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). On the other hand, the benefits of disclosure especially those related to 
costs of financing are more important to controlling shareholders than minority 
shareholders (Shi et al., 2012). Thus, the alternative explanation from agency theory is 
that, quality accounting information is an effective means by which firms reduce the cost 
of financing when saddled with significant agency problems. 
Stakeholder theory also provides additional explanation for the reasons why firms 
may adopt certain international standards and by extension produce quality accounting 
information. Under this theory, the different shareholders of a business exert pressures on 
the firm to adopt some practices and procedures. The stakeholder theory holds that the 
firm has responsibilities to stakeholders in addition to its obligations to shareholders 
(Mason and Simmons 2014). In this regard, firms will tend to undertake activities that 
will serve the long-term interests of stakeholders. Prakash and Potoski (2007) and Fikru 
(2014) have argued respectively that investors and creditors can mount pressure on firms 
to comply with international best practices. The implication of stakeholder theory for our 
work is that, stakeholders of cross-border banks such as customers, investors, auditors, 
suppliers, tax authorities, regulatory authorities, various shareholders, creditors, media, 
local community, international affiliates among others, will exert an influence on their 
quality of accounting reporting. 
2.2 Empirical literature 
The bulk of the empirical evidence on the link between institutional quality and the 
quality of accounting information is based on industrial firms. In this regard, La Porta  
et al. (1998) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) find that strong institutions reduce the ability 
for insiders to consume private control benefits and by so doing improve the authenticity 
of accounting information. In another study, Haw et al. (2004) report that earnings 
management is hindered in countries with strong competition laws, free media and high 
tax enforcement. Similarly, Hung (2000) documents that countries with weak institutions 
and poor investor protection laws are more likely to have opportunistic mangers who will 
manage earnings to increase private benefit. 
Ball et al. (2000) note that, perhaps, political influence with respect to setting 
standards and ensuring compliance is the major factor driving cross-country differences  
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The effects of cross-border banking and institutional quality 245    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
in accounting. Pagano and Volpin (2005) further find that strong institutions foster 
transparency and timely disclosures. In a more recent study, Anagnostopoulou (2016) 
reports that financial reporting becomes more valuable to lenders as legal institutions are 
strengthened to ensure credible financial reporting. Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) examine 
the impact of national culture on earnings quality of banks from 39 countries and find 
that, before the financial crises (1993–2006), banks operating in countries with high 
individualism, low uncertainty avoidance and high masculinity manage earnings just to 
meet or beat the earnings in the previous year. They also show that banks in economies 
with the above characteristics tend to smooth earnings. Within the crises period  
(2007–2009), they discover that countries with national cultures that promote risk taking 
had more stressed banks. They used managing earnings to just-meet-or-beat prior year’s 
earnings and LLP as measures of earnings management. 
Presenting evidence on the effect of institutional factors on earnings quality of banks 
in 35 countries, Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) find during the pre-crises period, a higher 
quality accounting information in countries with strong institutional frameworks which 
constrained insider expropriation while enhancing the protection of outside investors. 
They reveal that, in the financial crises period, banks that domiciled in countries with 
strong institutions had a lower propensity to report losses, recorded low LLP and stronger 
balance sheets. Abdelsalam et al. (2016) investigate earnings management under different 
monitoring regimes for banks in the Middle East and North Africa and find that, 
compared to their conventional counterparts, Islamic banks are less likely to engage in 
earnings management. This is because of the religious norms and moral accountability 
imposed by Islamic banking. The monitoring activities of debt holders have been shown 
not to be effective in reducing tax avoidance related earnings management among 
Ghanaian firms (Amidu and Yorke, 2017). In examining the role of internal institutions, 
Maskati and Hamdan (2017) establish a positive relationship between each of largest 
shareholder, board size, degree of independence of board of directors and voluntary 
disclosure by firms. 
The empirical literature on the effect of cross-border banking on the quality of 
accounting information is nascent. Léon (2016) in a study on cross-border banking and 
competition in Africa finds that, the resurgence of cross-border banking elevated 
competition in the African banking system. We can judge from the ability for foreign 
banks to induce competition to the effect that, cross-border banks will have the incentive 
to disclose quality accounting information in order to remain competitive. Hassan (2015) 
finds from banks sampled from Nigeria that, firm size, leverage, profitability and growth 
were the main drivers of earnings quality following the adoption of the IFRS. A related 
study by Ghodbane (2016) finds that foreign owned firms and subsidiaries of foreign 
firms preparing consolidated financial statements according to IFRS were more likely to 
voluntarily adopt IFRS. Lang et al. (2006) discover that international firms cross-listed on 
the US capital market were more likely to smooth earnings and also less likely to 
discover losses on a timely basis. They further find that cross-listed firms from countries 
with weak investor protection laws were more likely to engage in earnings management. 
This paper analyses AIQ of specific cross-border banks across different African countries 
to ascertain whether institutional quality plays a major role in the financial reporting 
quality of banks operating in Africa. 
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3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Data sources 
Micro-bank level and macro-country level data are used. Bank level data (financial 
statements) are taken from BankScope database maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van 
Dijk. Series are yearly, and covering a sample of 330 banks across 29 countries in Africa 
during the 12 year period, 2002–2013. The study focuses on the African banking sector. 
Given the relationship between finance and the real economy, the benefits of conducting 
research in these sectors can be wide ranging. Thus, the benefits and the subsequent 
impact of research on emerging economies like Africa on economic growth cannot be 
merely measured in absolute dollar terms, but in the number of people that are elevated 
from a desperate subsistence level to a more adequate standard of living (Bekaert and 
Harvey, 2002). The sample includes all commercial banks, cooperative banks, 
development banks, savings banks, real estate and mortgage banks for which annual data 
is available for some period of the years during the period 2002–2013. To ensure that 
banks that are important players in the deposit and/or loan markets are not omitted, 
medium and long-term credit banks and specialised government institutions are included, 
as they remain important in African countries. Observations with outliers such as zero 
and/or negative capitalisation are dropped. Also, observations for capitalisation above the 
99th percentile were dropped. In addition, loan growth rate observations above the  
99th percentile of the distribution were equally dropped. This is to correct for mergers, 
acquisitions and start-ups during the study period. Macro-country-level data are obtained 
from the International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Development Indicators (2014) database of the World Bank. Regulatory 
and supervisory variables are obtained from Barth et al. (2013) and governance and 
institutional quality data are obtained from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
3.2 Measurement of variables 
In analysing AIQ or earnings quality, different concepts are presented. Dechow et al. 
(2010) posit that low quality exists when financial reports are manipulated, or when an 
exaggerated number of non-recurring items or lack of transparency exist in the 
accounting disclosure process, or even when accounting choices are made in line with 
current accounting standards. Thus, an AIQ concept becomes complex, depending on its 
user’s objective. Burgstahler et al. (2006) argue that the level of earnings management is 
an accounting quality measure, as it particularly responds to the incentives of a firm’s 
information disclosure. Others consider that earnings management is a consequence of 
the manager’s discretionary actions to manipulate accounting information on firm 
performance. For the purpose of this study, banks earnings management is employed as a 
proxy for AIQ. Previous studies show that earnings management in banks commonly 
occur using LLP. Similarly, Adams et al. (2009) and Nichols et al. (2009) document the 
use of loan loss reserves to manage accounting earnings. In addition, Hasan and Wall 
(2004, p.132) summarise the accounting process employed to determine the level of the 
balance sheet loan loss allowance (LLA) and the income statement account LLP. 
Given the nature of discretionary choices associated with the banks, the income 
statement accounts of LLP are examined for evidence of earnings management. In 
addition to increasing loan loss reserves in the balance sheet, increase in loan loss 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The effects of cross-border banking and institutional quality 247    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
provision decreases net earnings, return on assets (ROA) as well as return on equity 
(ROE). Therefore, to analyse the influence of managerial discretion on quality of 
accounting information, a two-stage approach is used to identify discretionary 
LLP/(LLA). In the first stage, the normal or nondiscretionary component of LLP/(LLA) 
is estimated by regressing LLP on beginning LLA/(loan loss provision), net loan charge-
offs, growth in loan, change in total loan outstanding, total loans outstanding, non-
performing loans, market share of loans, earnings before tax and LLP, and country 
specific variables using the following model: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
4
it it it it it it
k
it it it j j t it
j
LLP LLA CHGOFF GLOAN LOAN LOAN
DNPA MKTS EBTP M λYEARDUMMY ε
=
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +∑
β β β β β β
β β β α  (1) 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
4
it it it it it it
k
it it it j j t it
j
LLA φ φ LLA φ CHOFF φ GLOAN φ LOAN φ LOAN
φ DNPA φ MKTS φ EBTP ψ M γYEARDUMMY e
=
= + + + + Δ +
+ + + + + +∑  
where LLPit / (LLAit) is the expected level of loan loss provision/(LLA) based on 
coefficient estimates from the sample of African banks from 2002-2013, LLAit / (LLPit) is 
the beginning LLA/(loan loss provision) of bank i in period t, CHGOFFit is the net loan 
charge-off of bank i in period t, GLOANit is the growth in loans of bank i in period t, 
ΔLOANSit is the change in total loan outstanding of bank i in period t, LOANSit is the loan 
portfolio of bank i in period t, DNPAit is an indicator variable that equals to one if the 
value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise2. MKTSit is the loan 
market share of bank i in period t, EBTPit is the earning before tax and profit of bank i in 
period t, the variables Mi, j are a set of {k} variables controlling for the respective 
countries’ macroeconomic environments and regulatory variables and εit and eit are error 
terms. The estimation of discretionary LLP(DLLP) / LLA(DLLA) is done by subtracting 
the predicted level or the non-discretional component of LLP / (LLA) from the actual 
level of LLP / (LLA)3. 
In the second stage, the link between the proxies for cross-border banking and 
institutional quality and the absolute value of negative DLLP / (DLLA) are tested. Again, 
we control for bank-specific variables (bank size, the level of leverage, market share and 
performance); country-level variables (such as inflation, GDP growth and GDP per 
capita), as presented in the following model. 
0 1 1 1 2 3 4
6 7 8
4
it it it it it it it
it it it
k
j j t it
j
DLLP DLLA DLLA DLLA CBB IQ DNPL
MKTS LOANS LEV
τ M ωYEARDUMMY v
− −
=
= + + + +
+ + +
+ + +∑
β β β β β
β β β  
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
it i it
i it i it
v η μ
E η E μ E η μ
= +
= = =  (2) 
DLLPit is the estimated loan loss provision of bank i in period t, is the estimated LLA of 
bank i in period t, DLLPit – 1 and DLLAit – 1 is the observation of the same bank in previous 
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year. CBBit is the Cross-border banking of bank i at period t. IQit is the institutional and 
political environment of bank i at period t. DNPLit is an indicator variable that is equal to 
one if the value for NPL is missing, zero otherwise, the logarithms of total assets is used 
as a measure of bank SIZEit, MKTSit is the loan market share of bank i in period t, 
LOANSit is the loan portfolio of bank i in period t, LEVit is the leverage of bank i in period 
t, the variables Mi, j are a set of {k} variables controlling for the respective countries’ 
macroeconomic environments and regulatory variables and vit is the error term. 
The interpretation of DLLP / (DLLA) vis-à-vis AIQ is as follows: a higher value or 
score of DLLP / (DLLA) means poor/high AIQ/earnings management and vice versa. 
Cross-border banking or foreign bank is measured as a dummy variable, taking the 
value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of a local bank by a foreign bank is 50% or 
more and 0 otherwise. The measure considers cross-border bank to be foreign-owned if 
they are controlled by shareholder or group of shareholders from outside the licensing 
jurisdiction. Control over a bank can be exercised if an individual or entity holds more 
than 50% of shares in a bank, subsidiary or branch. It should be noted that, in some cases 
where there is no majority shareholder, the bank is still classified as foreign-owned when 
a foreign minority shareholder has a controlling stake in a bank. 
A number of indices are used to assess institutional and political environments of 
selected African countries. The strength and quality of a country’s institutions reflect the 
ability of policy authorities to identify various forms of anticompetitive conduct in 
banking and impose sanctions where appropriate. The study employs four indicators 
obtained from the ICRG as measures of institutional quality. Transparency is an inverse 
of corruption within the political system. The quality of the judicial system and the 
general observance of the law is denoted by law quality. Corruption especially financial 
corruption makes financial markets less efficient by generating networking effects that 
lead to anticompetitive behaviour. It is expected that in countries with high corruption 
(i.e., low transparency), the adherence to accounting systems and procedures tends to be 
very low, and this is more pronounced for large banks with greater political power. The 
corruption variable captures the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain. Bureaucratic quality represents the quality of administrative infrastructure. The 
quality and relevance of laws enacted is denoted as the legislative quality. Higher values 
for these indicators reflect higher institutional quality. Variables measuring transparency 
and legal quality range in value from zero to six. Bureaucratic quality and legislative 
strength variables range between zero and four. Banks view institutional quality as 
predetermined in that they observe the level of institutional strength and quality in the 
previous period and set their lending rates and overall strategy accordingly. This 
therefore means that a change in institutions today affects the bank behaviour with 
respect to accounting information in the next period. Thus all the institutional variables in 
equation (2) are lagged. 
A number of additional control variables which prior studies have shown to affect the 
level of AIQ (Adams et al., 2009; Dechow et al. (2010) have been included. For bank-
level controls, the ratio of loan to total assets (bank loan) is used as a measure of the level 
of risk. The logarithm of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank size. Market share 
is measured as the loan market share of bank. Bank leverage is measured as total liability  
divided by total assets. GDP growth, and inflation are included in the regression to  
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account for differences in macroeconomic environments, and the general economic 
development. Accordingly, inflation is defined as the rate of annual growth in the 
consumer price index (CPI). The banking freedom index measures the openness of the 
banking sector and the extent to which banks are free to operate their businesses. Capital 
index measures overall capital stringency. It ranges from zero to nine, with a higher value 
indicating greater stringency. Property right is included as a measure of risk of 
expropriation. It measures the degree to which the individual country laws protect and 
enforce private property rights. 
3.3 Estimating techniques 
The paper used the system generalised method of moment (system GMM) estimator as 
previous studies identified the need to control for endogeneity of earning management 
decisions since banks may choose to manage their earnings mainly as a reaction to 
market events. The problem with applying OLS in estimating Equation (2) is that DLLP 
and DLLA which are the dependent variables cause a correlation between the previous 
observations DLLPit – 1 and DLLAit, c – 1 and the error term, which gives rise to a dynamic 
panel bias. There is also evidence that OLS produces bias when attempts are made to 
control for heterogeneity. In addition, if significant events such as M&A are not 
explicitly modelled, they will remain embedded in the error term and continue to 
influence subsequent contemporaneous observations. This autocorrelation is a violation 
of an assumption necessary for the consistency of OLS. Therefore, as proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995) as an alternative estimator, 
system GMM estimator addresses the persistence of endogeneity bias. System GMM is 
more robust to missing data since lagged observations enter the equation as instruments 
instead of as regressors. System GMM also creates a possible instance to include time-
invariant regressors, for instance, specific regulations which would have otherwise 
disappeared in the first-difference GMM. Furthermore it uses a Windmeijer correction to 
the standard errors which improves robustness to heteroskedasticity. 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for key variables used in the study. All bank specific 
variables are averaged by bank during the period 2002-2013. For the purpose of 
descriptive statistics the banks in Africa are grouped as 
1 all sample 
2 Northern 
3 Central 
4 Southern Africa countries. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
   Mean SD Min Max 
AIQ 
 Discretionary loan loss Aggregate 0.009 0.023 –0.065 0.769 
 Provision (DLLP) North 0.012 0.034 –0.039 0.769 
  Central 0.007 0.020 –0.065 0.306 
  South 0.008 0.013 –0.064 0.117 
 Discretionary loan loss Aggregate –0.051 0.087 –0.693 0.662 
 Allowance (DLLA) North –0.044 0.093 –0.693 0.351 
  Central –0.044 0.090 –0.281 0.662 
  South –0.067 0.073 –0.284 0.574 
 Cross-border banking Aggregate 0.526 0.500 0.000 1.000 
  North 0.407 0.492 0.000 1.000 
  Central 0.525 0.500 0.000 1.000 
  South 0.625 0.484 0.000 1.000 
Institutional quality 
 Bureaucratic quality Aggregate 1.581 0.628 0.000 2.500 
  North 1.889 0.314 1.000 2.000 
  Central 1.389 0.764 0.000 2.500 
  South 1.565 0.501 0.667 2.500 
 Transparency Aggregate 1.917 0.723 0.000 3.958 
  North 1.862 0.542 1.000 3.000 
  Central 1.769 0.725 0.500 3.750 
  South 2.197 0.798 0.000 3.958 
 Law quality Aggregate 3.249 1.112 0.500 6.000 
  North 3.889 0.974 2.000 6.000 
  Central 2.641 0.850 1.500 5.000 
  South 3.534 1.119 0.500 6.000 
Notes: Table 1 presents summary statistics on key bank specific, macroeconomic and 
other variables used in the study. AIQ is measured by discretionary loan loss 
provision (DLLP) and discretionary LLA (DLLA). Cross-border banking is 
measured as a dummy variable taking a value of 1 where the shareholding 
proportion of the local banks by foreign banks is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. 
Institutional quality is measured by bureaucratic quality, transparency, law quality 
and legislative quality. DNPL is measured by a value of one if the value for non-
performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise. The ratio of loan to total assets 
(bank loan) is used as a measure of the level of risk. The logarithm of total assets 
is employed as a proxy for bank size valued in US dollars. Market share is 
measured by the loan market share of banks and leverage measures bank leverage. 
Higher values of banking freedom signify higher freedom from governmental 
control. Higher scores of property right indicate certainty of legal protection of 
property right and limited expropriation risk. Capital stringency is the regulatory 
capital requirement. GDP growth accounts for the difference in economic 
development across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on CPI. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
   Mean SD Min Max 
Institutional quality 
 Legislative quality Aggregate 3.271 0.723 1.125 4.000 
  North 3.594 0.392 2.625 4.000 
  Central 2.944 0.755 1.542 4.000 
  South 3.444 0.724 1.125 4.000 
Bank -specific control variables 
 DNPL  Aggregate 0.613 0.487 0.000 1.000 
  North 0.856 0.351 0.000 1.000 
  Central 0.499 0.500 0.000 1.000 
  South 0.576 0.494 0.000 1.000 
 Bank loan Aggregate 0.515 0.186 0.015 1.000 
  North 0.530 0.219 0.017 1.000 
  Central 0.507 0.145 0.041 0.971 
  South 0.515 0.209 0.015 0.999 
 Leverage Aggregate 0.860 0.113 0.001 1.000 
  North 0.878 0.088 0.400 1.000 
  Central 0.865 0.070 0.390 0.985 
  South 0.836 0.167 0.001 0.979 
 Market share Aggregate 0.113 0.135 0.000 0.972 
  North 0.073 0.117 0.000 0.905 
  Central 0.128 0.138 0.001 0.972 
  South 0.125 0.137 0.000 0.844 
 Bank size (US$ 
million) 
Aggregate 2078.62 7288.96 0.200 123214 
North 3746.33 5918.47 22.100 45164.5 
Central 561.837 1228.35 0.800 12967.2 
South 2971.77 12211.7 0.200 123214 
Notes: Table 1 presents summary statistics on key bank specific, macroeconomic and 
other variables used in the study. AIQ is measured by DLLP and DLLA.  
Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable taking a value of 1 where 
the shareholding proportion of the local banks by foreign banks is 50% or more 
and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured by bureaucratic quality, 
transparency, law quality and legislative quality. DNPL is measured by a value of 
one if the value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise. The 
ratio of loan to total assets (bank loan) is used as a measure of the level of risk. 
The logarithm of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank size valued in US 
dollars. Market share is measured by the loan market share of banks and leverage 
measures bank leverage. Higher values of banking freedom signify higher 
freedom from governmental control. Higher scores of property right indicate 
certainty of legal protection of property right and limited expropriation risk. 
Capital stringency is the regulatory capital requirement. GDP growth accounts for 
the difference in economic development across countries. Inflation is the rate of 
inflation based on CPI. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
   Mean SD Min Max 
Macroeconomic variable 
 Inflation Aggregate 47.829 934.991 –3.100 24411 
  North 6.412 5.124 0.922 37.393 
  Central 9.148 6.496 –3.100 44.391 
  South 134.011 1661.719 1.386 24411 
 GDP growth Aggregate 0.053 0.040 –0.177 0.275 
  North 0.050 0.020 0.017 0.113 
  Central 0.055 0.036 –0.057 0.275 
  South 0.054 0.054 –0.177 0.227 
 Property right Aggregate 39.074 13.012 5.000 75.000 
  North 41.215 9.639 30.000 70.000 
  Central 35.999 9.749 10.000 50.000 
  South 41.926 17.536 5.000 75.000 
 Banking freedom Aggregate 46.750 14.132 10.000 90.000 
  North 39.352 13.795 20.000 90.000 
  Central 46.643 11.757 20.000 70.000 
  South 52.338 14.963 10.000 70.000 
 Capital stringency Aggregate 3.552 1.587 0 6.000 
  North 3.067 1.563 1.000 5.000 
  Central 3.977 1.383 0 5.000 
  South 3.36 1.715 1.000 6.000 
Notes: Table 1 presents summary statistics on key bank specific, macroeconomic and 
other variables used in the study. AIQ is measured by DLLP and DLLA.  
Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable taking a value of 1 where 
the shareholding proportion of the local banks by foreign banks is 50% or more 
and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured by bureaucratic quality, 
transparency, law quality and legislative quality. DNPL is measured by a value of 
one if the value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise. The 
ratio of loan to total assets (bank loan) is used as a measure of the level of risk. 
The logarithm of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank size valued in US 
dollars. Market share is measured by the loan market share of banks and leverage 
measures bank leverage. Higher values of banking freedom signify higher 
freedom from governmental control. Higher scores of property right indicate 
certainty of legal protection of property right and limited expropriation risk. 
Capital stringency is the regulatory capital requirement. GDP growth accounts for 
the difference in economic development across countries. Inflation is the rate of 
inflation based on CPI. 
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DLLP DLLA 
Cross border 
banking 
DNPL Transparency
Law 
quality
Bureaucrati
c quality 
Legislative 
growth 
Loan 
Market 
share 
Property 
right 
Bank 
freedom 
Capital 
stringent 
DLLP 1.000             
DLLA –0.260* 1..000            
Cross border banking –0.014 –0.096* 1.000           
DNPL 0.240* –0.207* –0.048* 1.000          
Transparency 0.042* –0.131* 0.146* 0.070* 1.000         
Law quality 0.034 –0.071* 0.078* 0.179* 0.380* 1.000        
Bureaucratic quality 0.014 0.084* –0.102* 0.018 –0.057* 0.055* 1.000       
Legislative quality 0.059* –0.012 0.171* 0.171* 0.455* 0.506* –0.048* 1.000      
Bank loan 0.025 0.045* –0.081* –0.050* 0.120* 0.203* 0.123* 0.018 1.000     
Market share –0.027 –0.059* 0.088* –0.089* 0.091* 0.007 –0.265* 0.097* 0.135* 1.000    
Property right 0.001 0.083* –0.024 0.017 0.276* 0.075* 0.421* 0.136* 0.193* –0.086* 1.000   
Bank freedom –0.019 –0.108* 0.108* –0.037 0.339* –0.018 0.092* –0.018 0.143* 0.000 0.446* 1.000  
Capital stringency 0.013 –0.078* 0.002 –0.114* –0.108* –0.299* 0.148* –0.261* 0.199* 0.054* 0.200* 0.137* 1.000 
Notes: Table 2 presents the pair wise correlation coefficients between selected variables. The data set comprises 320 banks in 29 countries during the period 2002–2013. 
*Implies significant at 5% or more. Accounting information quality is measured by discretionary loan loss provision (DLLP) and discretionary loan loss allowance 
(DLLA). Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable taking a value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by foreign banks is 50% or 
more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured by bureaucratic quality, transparency, law quality and legislative quality. For bank-level controls, DNPL is 
measured by a value of one if the value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise, the ratio of loan to total assets bank loan is used as a measure of the 
level of risk. The logarithm of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank size valued in US dollars. Market share is measured by the loan market share of banks. Higher 
values of banking freedom signify the higher freedom from governmental control. Higher scores of Property risk indicate certainty of legal protection of property right 
and limited expropriation risk. Capital stringency is regulatory capital requirement. GDP growth accounts for the difference in economic development across countries. 
Inflation is the rate of inflation based on CPI. 
Source: Bank scope and author’s estimation. The data comprises 330 banks across 29 countries over the period 2002–2013.
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This categorisation of countries is made by the World Bank.4 This allows the researchers 
to examine whether there are regional differences in the selected variables over time. The 
mean values of 0.009 for DLLP and –0.051 for DLLA show a very low AIQ. The 
minimum and maximum values are –0.065 and 0.769 for DLLP and –0.693 and 0.662 for 
DLLA respectively. These denote a presence of low AIQ amongst sampled banks. 
Although there is a presence of discretionary accounting information among sampled 
banks, not every bank aggressively engages in the practice of managing earnings. This is 
also evidenced in the record of negative values for the overall mean and minimum values. 
A high standard deviation of 0.087 for DLLA and 0.023 for DLLP are observed 
indicating great variations among banks with respect to their discretional behaviours. 
This may indicate that some firm specific characteristics play important roles when it 
comes to decisions of management to engage in earnings manipulative behaviour, even 
though the banks in Northern zones appear to have discretionally managed their 
accounting information. The banks however appear to diversify geographically as the 
mean sample of cross-border banking is 0.526. There appears to be a strong bureaucratic 
structure in banks in Africa with a mean of 1.581. Similar scores are observed for the 
quality of law and legislative quality with means of 3.25 and 3.27 respectively. There is 
significant variation in the sizes of the banks in the sample. The mean of total assets is 
$2.08bn which ranges from $0.2m to $123.2bn. The mean market share is 0.113. The 
banks however appear to have high property right (39.2) and capital stringency (3.6) 
implying limited expropriation risk and more legal protection right. The mean banking 
freedom value of 46.8 suggests that banks are allowed the maximum freedom to operate 
in Africa with minimal governmental control. 
Table 2 presents the pair-wise correlation coefficients as a preliminary analysis of the 
relationship among AIQ, CBB and institutional quality. CBB, all institutional quality 
variables (except bureaucratic quality) are associated with low incidence of earnings 
management. Likewise the banks with higher market share. As expected, banks in Africa 
engage in earnings management through non-performing loan allowance (DLLA). 
4.2 Evaluating AIQ (AIQ): DLLP 
We begin with the estimation of non-discretionary component of LLP. The result of the 
first-stage regression is presented in Table 3. As estimated, the LLA is positively and 
significantly related to LLP since a lower initial LLA will require a higher LLP in the 
current period. Net charge-off, growth in loan and loan outstanding have positive 
association with LLP. These mean that an increase in current LLP is as a result of a 
corresponding increase in the net charge-off loans, the growth in loans as well as an 
increase in outstanding bank loans. The managers of banks in Africa thus will manage 
their earnings by manipulating the net charge-off of loans and extending loans without 
thorough screening and monitoring of the borrowers. Our finding is consistent with 
earlier studies (Adams et al., 2009; Kanagaretnan et al., 2010, etc.). A case of interest 
here is that of the Lehman Brothers’ strategy of advancing loans and selling their assets 
just to meet regulatory capital requirements. 
Next, we investigate the link between Cross-border banking, institutional quality and 
AIQ using LLP of banks in Africa. Table 4 presents the regression results where the 
dependent variable is AIQ measured by DLLP (DLLP). The results are presented in 
columns depending on the type of institutional quality variable used: column 1, 2, 3, 4  
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and 5 for bureaucratic quality, transparency, law quality and legislative quality and 
overall respectively. The results show that all of the institutional quality measures but 
Transparency are insignificant in explaining AIQ. Transparency on the other hand 
increases AIQ and hence loan loss provision. This means transparency helps in 
establishing strong and reliable accounting information. Also, Cross-border banking is 
insignificant with respect to all the institutional quality measures with the exception of 
banks with high levels of transparency where it decreases DLLP. This means  
cross-border banking enhances AIQ of transparent banks in Africa. Barth et al. (2006) 
argue that cross listing may improve accounting quality as cross listed firms may have 
some individual specific firm incentives and still be influenced by home country 
institutions. 
Table 3 Stage-one regression in estimating abnormal LLP 
 Coefficient Std. err. 
Intercept –0.00846*** 0.00260 
LLA 0.05175*** 0.00674 
CHGOFF 0.01250*** 0.00439 
GLOAN 0.00850*** 0.00276 
ΔLOAN –0.01567** 0.00766 
LOAN 0.01397*** 0.00302 
DNPL –0.00783*** 0.00228 
MKTS –0.00475 0.00406 
EBTP 0.07784*** 0.01372 
GDP per capita –0.15563** 0.07011 
GDP growth 0.14241** 0.06622 
INFL –0.00008** 0.00003 
Diagnostics tests   
Obs  614 
R2  47.9 
Fixed effect within  N 
Year dummy  Y 
Country dummy  N 
Wald (p-value)  161.77** 
Notes: The dependent variable is LLP which is the non-discretionary component of loan 
loss provision. This is regressed against LLA, the non-discretionary component of 
loan loss reserves. CHGOFF is the ratio of net charge-offs to average loans during 
the period. GLOAN is the growth in loan. ΔLOAN is the change in total loan 
outstanding. LOAN is the loan portfolio of bank scaled by total assets. DNPL is an 
indicator variable that equals to one if non-performing loan is missing and zero if 
otherwise. MKTS is the market share of the respective bank. EBTP is earnings 
before tax and provisions, and GDP per capita, GDP growth and INFL are the 
macroeconomic variables representing GDP per capita, GDP growth and inflation 
respectively. Parameter estimates are reported with the small sample adjusted 
standard errors. *** and ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% and 5% 
level respectively. 
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Table 4 Evaluating accounting information: DLLP 
 DLLP 
Bureaucratic Transparency Law quality Legislative All 
DLLP lag 0.0009 0.0369 0.0044 0.0647 0.1573 
(0.0985) (0.0868) (0.0772) (0.1060) (0.1189) 
Cross-border banking –0.0013 –0.0144** 0.0024 -0.0032 –0.0007 
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0044) 
Bureaucratic quality –0.0016    –0.0027 
(0.0045)    (0.0023) 
Transparency  0.0052***   0.0013 
 (0.0016)   (0.0016) 
Law quality   –0.0019  –0.0057** 
  (0.0030)  (0.0025) 
Legislative quality    0.0023 0.0030 
   (0.0018) (0.0019) 
Market share 0.0013 0.0204* –0.0093 -0.0028 0.0004 
(0.0157) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0100) 
DNPL  0.0150*** 0.0079** 0.0169*** 0.0102*** 0.0108*** 
(0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
Bank size –0.0011 –0.0014 0.0003 –0.0004 0.0001 
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0006) 
GDP growth 0.0137 –0.0224 0.0155 –0.0098 –0.0276 
(0.0223) (0.0260) (0.0201) (0.0264) (0.0183) 
Notes: Table 4 reports the two stage system GMM regression result with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ and is 
measured here by DLLP. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by 
foreign banks is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured by 
bureaucratic quality, transparency, law quality and legislative quality. DNPL is 
measured by a value of one if the value for non-performing loan is missing and 
zero, if otherwise. The logarithm of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank 
size. Market share is measured by the loan market share of banks. GDP growth 
accounts for the difference in economic development across countries. Inflation is 
the rate of inflation based on CPI. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis,  
***, ** and *indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The following diagnostic tests are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 the number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of instruments 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals of which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
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Table 4 Evaluating accounting information: DLLP (continued) 
 DLLP 
Bureaucratic Transparency Law quality Legislative All 
Inflation –0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 –0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
Diagnostic test 
 Number of instruments 1,575 1,643 1,666 1,666 1,552 
 Number of Groups 265 278 283 283 260 
 F-test 4.08*** 5.91*** 6.38*** 7.28*** 11.66 
 Hansen test 128.53 108.95 121.97 124.67 181.89 
 P value 0.432 0.35 0.11 0.12 0.189 
 AR(2) test 0.19 0.31 0.04 0.41 0.71 
 P value 0.847 0.758 0.965 0.681 0.476 
Notes: Table 4 reports the two stage system GMM regression result with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ and is 
measured here by DLLP. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by 
foreign banks is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured by 
bureaucratic quality, transparency, law quality and legislative quality. DNPL is 
measured by a value of one if the value for non-performing loan is missing and 
zero, if otherwise. The logarithm of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank 
size. Market share is measured by the loan market share of banks. GDP growth 
accounts for the difference in economic development across countries. Inflation is 
the rate of inflation based on CPI. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis,  
***, ** and *indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The following diagnostic tests are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 the number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of instruments 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals of which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
The results show that non-performing loans (DNPL) is positive and statistically 
significant across all the institutional quality variables. This result suggests that banks in 
Africa with high non-performing loans tend to produce low AIQ. However with the 
inclusion of all the variables, Cross-border banking and the institutional quality measure 
do not have an effect on AIQ with the exception of law quality (which was found to 
decrease accounting information of banks in Africa). It can be argued that factors 
required to ensure the proper adherence to producing quality accounting information 
should not give room for management discretion. Such discretions provide room for 
managers to opportunistically manage financial figures for their own private benefit.5 
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Table 5 Evaluating accounting information: DLLA 
 DLLA 
Bureaucratic Transparency Law quality Legislative All 
DLLA lag 0.4270*** 0.5259*** 0.5683*** 0.4982*** 0.6275*** 
(0.0649) (0.0651) (0.0610) (0.0549) (0.0550) 
Cross-border banking –0.0309* –0.0399** –0.0375 –0.0510** –0.0532*** 
(0.0168) (0.0174) (0.0244) (0.0217) (0.0204) 
Bureaucratic quality 0.0169    –0.0162 
(0.0162)    (0.0120) 
Transparency  0.0179***   –0.0032 
 (0.0065)   (0.0069) 
Law quality   0.0218  0.0242* 
  (0.0133)  (0.0140) 
Legislative quality    0.0238* 0.0153 
   (0.0126) (0.0103) 
Market share 0.0444 0.0325 0.0163 –0.0281 0.0176 
(0.0490) (0.0499) (0.0642) (0.0636) (0.0563) 
DNPL –0.0193 –0.0071 –0.0161 –0.0109 –0.0175 
(0.0159) (0.0114) (0.0124) (0.0091) (0.0135) 
Bank size –0.0075** –0.0043 –0.0045 –0.0022 –0.0055** 
(0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0025) 
GDP growth –0.1498 –0.1879** –0.1414 –0.1282 –0.0595 
(0.0983) (0.0784) (0.0866) (0.0842) (0.0683) 
Inflation 0.0001 0.0007 –0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0002 
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Notes: Table 5 reports the two stage system GMM regression results with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ and is 
measured here by DLLA. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by 
foreign banks is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured by 
bureaucratic quality, transparency, law quality and legislative quality. DNPL is 
measured by a value of one if the value for non-performing loan is missing and 
zero, if otherwise. The logarithm of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank 
size. Market share is measured by the loan market share of banks. GDP growth 
accounts for the difference in economic development across countries. Inflation is 
the rate of inflation based on CPI. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis,  
***, ** and *indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The following diagnostic test are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 the number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of instruments 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
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Table 5 Evaluating accounting information: DLLA (continued) 
 DLLA 
Bureaucratic Transparency Law quality Legislative All 
Diagnostic test 
 Number of instruments 1,575 1,643 1,666 1,666 1,552 
 Number of groups 265 278 283 283 260 
 F-test 6.76*** 11.33*** 15.83*** 15.84*** 19.62*** 
 Hansen test 105.48 103.81 107.49 107.45 181.31 
 P value 0.261 0.487 0.388 0.389 0.197 
 AR(2) test 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.62 1.56 
 P value 0.112 0.12 0.119 0.105 0.119 
Notes: Table 5 reports the two stage system GMM regression results with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ and is 
measured here by DLLA. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by 
foreign banks is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured by 
bureaucratic quality, transparency, law quality and legislative quality. DNPL is 
measured by a value of one if the value for non-performing loan is missing and 
zero, if otherwise. The logarithm of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank 
size. Market share is measured by the loan market share of banks. GDP growth 
accounts for the difference in economic development across countries. Inflation is 
the rate of inflation based on CPI. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis,  
***, ** and *indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The following diagnostic test are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 the number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of instruments 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
4.2.1 Evaluating AIQ: DLLA 
Here we investigate the relationship between Cross-border banking, institutional quality 
and AIQ by employing LLAs of banks in Africa. Here the dependent variable is AIQ and 
measured by DLLA. Similar to Table 4, the results are presented in columns depending 
on the type of institutional quality variable used: column 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for Bureaucratic 
quality, Transparency, Law quality and Legislative quality and overall respectively. The 
results presented on Table 5 show that Cross-border -banking decreases LLA, the 
measure of AIQ. This is in line with the findings of Berger et al. (2000) that cross-border 
banks that operate inefficiently are the best candidates for takeovers and the most 
susceptible are those banks that are cross-listed. Taking this into consideration, it can be 
posited that these banks face pressure to perform efficiently thereby increasing their 
incentive to manage earnings to mask their true performance and to portray a better 
picture than the actual case. The institutional quality measures, transparency and 
legislative quality increase LLA while bureaucratic quality and law quality are 
insignificant in explaining AIQ. Also bank size was found to decrease LLA hence AIQ of 
banks in Africa. GDP growth decreases LLA in terms of transparency. The coefficient on 
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the GDP growth suggests that increase in the general performance of the economy will 
lead to the production of high AIQ. Secondly, when there is economic growth the banks 
are in the position to earn higher income, and secure efficient managers to execute high 
AIQ. 
4.3 Determinants of AIQ: regulatory and supervisory controls 
To draw a more accurate conclusion concerning the link among Cross-border banking, 
institutional quality and AIQ, the regulatory and supervisory framework in Africa is 
thoroughly considered. This is because banks in Africa may be deriving benefits from 
institutional reforms in a way that overstates the impact of Cross-border banking and 
institutional quality on accounting information if these structures are not explicitly 
included in the estimation. 
4.3.1 Banking freedom 
The Heritage Foundation index of banking and financial freedom, ‘banking freedom’, 
measures the openness of the banking sector and the extent to which banks are free to 
operate their businesses. The result of the baseline regression with the inclusion of 
“Banking freedom” is reported in Tables 6a, 6b, 7a and 7b. In relation to banking 
freedom, in Tables 6a and 6b, it does not on its own affect AIQ (DLLP) but greater 
banking freedom does influence other variables like non-performing loans and bank size 
which in turn has an effect on loan loss provision hence AIQ of banks. Non-performing 
loans increase loan loss provision (decrease AIQ) while bank size decreases loan loss 
provision (increases AIQ) in banks with levels of transparency. However in terms of 
LLA, in Tables 7a and 7b, variables like market share, GDP growth, inflation and the 
institutional quality measures such as transparency, law quality and legislative quality 
and Cross-border banking were influenced by the inclusion of banking freedom. A bank 
with larger market share increases AIQ while Cross-border banking increases AIQ in 
banks with high levels of transparency, law quality and legislative quality. High levels of 
transparency, law quality and legislative decrease AIQ. While GDP growth increases 
AIQ in banks with levels of transparency and inflation decreases AIQ in banks with 
levels of bureaucracy. However, non-performing loans loses its significance with the 
inclusion of banking freedom. 
4.3.2 Property right 
Low risk of expropriation is fundamental to the volume and stability of the flow of 
foreign capital, a key driver of economic growth and development in Africa. Ahmed et al. 
(2013) find evidence, which confirms that IFRS adoption leads to increase in accounting 
quality, they however observe that their findings hold true for firms in strong 
enforcement countries. In this section the independent effect of state level investor 
protection is controlled for by including (property right), an index that measures 
expropriation risk as shown in Tables 6a, 6b, 7a and 7b. The results on Tables 6a, 6b, 7a 
and 7b) do not explain the notion that property right index affects AIQ in banks with high 
levels of institutional quality. Property right decreases AIQ in banks with high levels of 
transparency (see Table 6a). As Leuz et al. (2003) suggest that, firms in countries with 
developed equity markets, dispersed ownership structures, strong investor rights, and 
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legal enforcement engage in less earnings quality. With the inclusion of property rights in 
Table 6a, legislative quality gains significance. Cross-border banking remains significant 
only in banks with high level of transparency. 
Table 6a Evaluating accounting Information: controlling for regulatory and supervisory 
environments 
 DLLP 
Bureaucratic quality Transparency 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DLLP lag 0.0086 –0.024 –0.0079 0.0637 0.0847 0.0726 
(0.0959) (0.0905) (0.0908) (0.0876) (0.0900) (0.0918) 
Cross-border banking –0.0048 –0.0034 0.0041 –0.0089 –0.0123** –0.0096* 
(0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0043) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0058) 
Bureaucratic quality –0.0034 –0.0059** –0.0036    
(0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0042)    
Transparency    0.0044*** 0.0037*** 0.0049*** 
   (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0016) 
Market share 0.0150 0.0081 0.0047 0.0097 0.0123 0.0207* 
(0.0138) (0.0161) (0.0154) (0.0113) (0.0134) (0.0123) 
DNPL  0.0140*** 0.0125*** 0.0163*** 0.0056** 0.0070** 0.0070* 
(0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0039) 
Bank size –0.0011 –0.0013* –0.0015 –0.0012* –0.0008 –0.0012* 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Banking freedom 0.0009   –0.0032   
(0.0024)   (0.0029)   
Notes: Table 6a reports the two stage system GMM regression result with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ and is 
measured here by DLLP. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by 
foreign banks is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured 
here by Bureaucratic quality and Transparency. DNPL is measured by a value of 
one if the value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise, the 
logarithm of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank size. Market share is 
measured by the loan market share of banks and leverage is leverage of banks. 
GDP growth accounts for the difference in economic development across 
countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on CPI. Higher values of banking 
freedom signify higher freedom from governmental control. Higher scores of 
property rights indicate certainty of legal protection and limited expropriation risk. 
Capital stringency is regulatory capital requirement. Standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis, ***, ** and *indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. The following diagnostic tests are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 the number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of independent variables 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals of which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
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Table 6a Evaluating accounting Information: controlling regulatory and supervisory 
environments (continued) 
 DLLP 
Bureaucratic quality Transparency 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exploration risk  0.0032   -0.0019  
 (0.0033)   (0.0030)  
Capital stringency   0.0031   0.0020 
  (0.0020)   (0.0025) 
GDP growth 0.0040 0.0093 0.0201 –0.0307 –0.0295 –0.0071 
(0.0227) (0.0219) (0.0224) (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0255) 
Inflation 0.0002 0.0003 –0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Diagnostic test 
 Number of instruments 1,535 1,535 1,575 1,603 1,603 1,638 
 Number of groups 256 256 265 269 269 278 
 F-test 5.45*** 5.35*** 4.23*** 6.64*** 5.88*** 5.76*** 
 Hansen test 158.98 149.38 132.65 146.46 141.33 127.44 
 P value 0.106 0.21 0.115 0.154 0.111 0.261 
 AR(2) test 0.18 0.48 0.25 0.49 0.59 0.55 
 P value 0.861 0.628 0.802 0.623 0.555 0.579 
Notes: Table 6a reports the two stage system GMM regression result with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ and is 
measured here by DLLP. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by 
foreign banks is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured 
here by Bureaucratic quality and Transparency. DNPL is measured by a value of 
one if the value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise, the 
logarithm of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank size. Market share is 
measured by the loan market share of banks and leverage is leverage of banks. 
GDP growth accounts for the difference in economic development across 
countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on CPI. Higher values of banking 
freedom signify higher freedom from governmental control. Higher scores of 
property rights indicate certainty of legal protection and limited expropriation risk. 
Capital stringency is regulatory capital requirement. Standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis, ***, ** and *indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. The following diagnostic tests are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 the number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of independent variables 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals of which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
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Table 6b Evaluating accounting information: controlling for regulatory and supervisory 
environments 
 DLLP 
Law quality Legislative quality 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
DLLP lag 0.0028 –0.00345 0.0228 0.0992 0.0751 0.1078 
(0.0860) (0.0809) (0.0794) (0.1109) (0.0935) (0.1041) 
Cross-border banking –0.0051 –0.0018 0.0013 –0.0029 –0.0052 0.0021 
(0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0056) (0.0045) 
Bureaucratic quality       
      
Transparency       
      
Law quality –0.0018 -0.0020 –0.0005    
(0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0029)    
Legislative quality    0.0021 0.0027* 0.0027 
   (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0020) 
Market share 0.0159 0.0057 –0.0104 0.0113 0.0066 –0.0057 
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0154) (0.0101) 
Discretionary  
f i
0.0127*** 0.0124*** 0.0153*** 0.008*** 0.0080** 0.0077*** 
Loans (DNPL) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0028) 
Bank size in US$ 
million 
–0.0008 –0.0004 0.0001 –0.0008 –0.0003 –0.0001 
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Banking freedom -0.0001   –0.0032   
(0.0021)   (0.0023)   
Notes: Table 6b reports the two stage system GMM regression results with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ and is 
measured by DLLA. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by 
foreign banks is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured 
here by law quality and legislative quality. DNPL is measured by a value of one if 
the value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise. The logarithm 
of total assets is employed as a proxy for Bank size. Market share is measured by 
the loan market share of banks. GDP growth accounts for the difference in 
economic development across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on 
CPI. Higher values of banking freedom signify higher freedom from governmental 
control. Higher scores of property rights indicate certainty of legal protection and 
limited expropriation risk. Capital stringency is the regulatory capital 
requirement. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis, ***, ** and *indicates 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The following diagnostic 
tests are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 the number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of independent variables 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals of which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   264 M. Amidu et al.    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Table 6b Evaluating accounting information: controlling for regulatory and supervisory 
environments (continued) 
 DLLP 
Law quality Legislative quality 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Exploration risk  –0.0010   –0.0018  
 (0.0028)   (0.0025)  
Capital stringency   0.0050*   0.0004 
  (0.0029)   (0.0021) 
GDP growth 0.0176 0.0139 0.0273 –0.0052 –0.0123 0.0040 
(0.0185) (0.0206) (0.0223) (0.0212) (0.0229) (0.0228) 
Inflation 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Diagnostic test 
 Number of instruments 1,626 1,626 1,661 1,626 1,626 1,661 
 Number of groups 274 274 283 274 274 283 
 F-test 5.25*** 6.36*** 6.24*** 6.36*** 5.60*** 7.98*** 
 Hansen test 169.98 161.23 133.39 162.58 143.81 126.89 
 P value 0.142 0.188 0.158 0.118 0.131 0.113 
 AR(2) test 0.00 0.08 0.18 0.66 0.50 0.70 
 P value 0.997 0.933 0.857 0.512 0.616 0.486 
Notes: Table 6b reports the two stage system GMM regression results with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ and is 
measured by DLLA. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by 
foreign banks is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured 
here by law quality and legislative quality. DNPL is measured by a value of one if 
the value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise. The logarithm 
of total assets is employed as a proxy for Bank size. Market share is measured by 
the loan market share of banks. GDP growth accounts for the difference in 
economic development across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on 
CPI. Higher values of banking freedom signify higher freedom from governmental 
control. Higher scores of property rights indicate certainty of legal protection and 
limited expropriation risk. Capital stringency is the regulatory capital 
requirement. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis, ***, ** and *indicates 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The following diagnostic 
tests are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 the number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of independent variables 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals of which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
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Table 7a Evaluating accounting information: controlling for regulatory and supervisory 
environments 
 DLLA 
Bureaucratic quality Transparency 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DLLP lag 0.5552*** 0.5290*** 0.4867*** 0.6021*** 0.5629*** 0.5797*** 
(0.0635) (0.0672) (0.0612) (0.0582) (0.0628) (0.0563) 
Cross-border 
banking 
–0.0115 –0.0119 –0.0503*** –0.0428** –0.0391* –0.0512*** 
(0.0154) (0.0164) (0.0179) (0.0185) (0.0211) (0.0175) 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
0.0134 0.0076 0.0204    
(0.0133) (0.0102) (0.0174)    
Transparency    0.0108** 0.0136** 0.0165** 
   (0.0048) (0.0058) (0.0067) 
Law quality       
      
Legislative quality       
      
Market share –0.0946*** –0.0773 –0.0096 –0.1018** –0.0700 0.0252 
(0.0361) (0.0470) (0.0701) (0.0479) (0.0588) (0.0511) 
Discretionary  
f i
0.0035 0.0213** –0.0178 0.0001 0.0010 –0.0082 
Loans (DNPL) (0.0096) (0.0085) (0.0149) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0146) 
Bank size in US$ 
million 
0.0012 0.0009 –0.0022 0.0001 0.0003 –0.0036 
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0031) 
Banking freedom –0.0059   –0.0066   
(0.0064)   (0.0093)   
Notes: Table 7a reports the two stage system GMM regression results with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ is measured 
here by DLLA. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by foreign banks 
is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured here by 
bureaucratic quality and transparency, DNPL is measured by a value of one if the 
value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise. The logarithm of 
total assets is employed as a proxy for bank size. Market share is measured by the 
loan market share of banks. GDP growth accounts for the difference in economic 
development across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on CPI. 
Higher values of banking freedom signify higher freedom from governmental 
control. Higher scores of property rights indicate certainty of legal protection and 
limited expropriation risk. Capital stringency is the regulatory capital 
requirement. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis, ***, ** and *indicates 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The following diagnostic 
test are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of instruments 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
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Table 7a Evaluating accounting information: controlling for regulatory and supervisory 
environments (continued) 
 DLLA 
Bureaucratic quality Transparency 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exploration risk  –0.0082   0.0266**  
 (0.0123)   (0.0116)  
Capital stringency   –0.0182**   –0.0046 
  (0.0075)   (0.0095) 
GDP growth 0.0053 –0.0675 –0.1732* –0.1359** –0.0653 –0.2236*** 
(0.0588) (0.0739) (0.0978) (0.0562) (0.0664) (0.0687) 
Inflation 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0009** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Diagnostic test 
 Number of 
instruments 
1,536 1,535 1,575 1,603 1,603 1,638 
 Number of groups 256 256 256 269 269 278 
 F-test 23.34*** 15.77*** 13.31*** 18.62*** 13.65*** 17.88*** 
 Hansen test 122.09 122.1 117.21 134.79 129.58 116.27 
 P value 0.506 0.308 0.325 0.369 0.302 0.528 
 AR(2) test 1.58 1.53 1.61 1.50 1.55 1.51 
 P value 0.113 0.126 0.108 0.133 0.121 1.31 
Notes: Table 7a reports the two stage system GMM regression results with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ is measured 
here by DLLA. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by foreign banks 
is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured here by 
bureaucratic quality and transparency, DNPL is measured by a value of one if the 
value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise. The logarithm of 
total assets is employed as a proxy for bank size. Market share is measured by the 
loan market share of banks. GDP growth accounts for the difference in economic 
development across countries. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on CPI. 
Higher values of banking freedom signify higher freedom from governmental 
control. Higher scores of property rights indicate certainty of legal protection and 
limited expropriation risk. Capital stringency is the regulatory capital 
requirement. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis, ***, ** and *indicates 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The following diagnostic 
test are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of instruments 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
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Table 7b Evaluating accounting information: controlling for regulatory and supervisory 
environments 
 DLLA 
Law quality Legislative quality 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
DLLP lag 0.6249*** 0.5955*** 0.5728*** 0.5243*** 0.5290*** 0.5181*** 
(0.0601) (0.0624) (0.0568) (0.0585) (0.0546) (0.0520) 
Cross-border 
banking 
–0.0320* –0.0468* –0.0492** –0.0561*** –0.0639** –0.0588*** 
(0.0178) (0.0250) (0.0223) (0.0177) (0.0257) (0.0211) 
Law quality 0.0216** 0.0187* 0.0131    
(0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0137)    
Legislative 
quality 
   0.0212* 0.0288** 0.0172 
   (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Market share –0.108*** –0.0969 0.0160 –0.0886** –0.0701 –0.0221 
(0.0406) (0.0627) (0.0675) (0.0366) (0.0677) (0.0662) 
DNPL  –0.0047 –0.0008 –0.0120 0.0004 0.0031 –0.0066 
(0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0113) (0.0094) (0.0088) (0.0098) 
Bank size –0.0021 –0.0012 –0.0033 0.0016 –0.0012 –0.0016 
(0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0034) 
Banking 
freedom 
–0.0084   –0.0005   
(0.0075)   (0.0074)   
Exploration risk  0.0098   0.0044  
 (0.0108)   (0.0111)  
Notes: Table 7b reports the two stage system GMM regression result with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ and is 
measured here as DLLA. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by 
foreign banks is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured 
here by law quality and legislative quality. DNPL is measured by a value of one if 
the value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise. The logarithm 
of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank size. Market share is measured by 
the loan market share of banks and leverage is leverage of banks. GDP growth 
accounts for the difference in economic development across countries. Inflation is 
the rate of inflation based on CPI. Higher values of banking freedom signify 
higher freedom from government controls. Higher scores of property rights 
indicate certainty of legal protection and limited expropriation risk. Capital 
stringency is regulatory capital requirement. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis, ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. The following diagnostic tests are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of explanatory variables 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals of which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   268 M. Amidu et al.    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Table 7b Evaluating accounting information: controlling for regulatory and supervisory 
environments (continued) 
 DLLA 
Law quality Legislative quality 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Capital 
stringency 
  –0.0166   –0.0042 
  (0.0101)   (0.0075) 
GDP growth –0.0984 –0.0904 –0.1580* –0.1253 –0.1308* –0.1781** 
(0.0694) (0.0833) (0.0948) (0.0776) (0.0791) (0.0806) 
Inflation 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0002 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Diagnostic test       
 Number of 
instruments 
1,626 1,626 1,661 1,626 1,626 1,661 
 Number of 
groups 
274 274 283 274 274 283 
 F-test 22.97*** 19.37*** 17.12*** 18.51*** 15.47*** 23.07*** 
 Hansen test 124.87 117.97 117.41 115.64 122.43 115.07 
 P value 0.611 0.586 0.576 0.812 0.472 0.555 
 AR(2) test 1.53 1.55 1.56 1.52 1.56 1.59 
 P value 0.126 0.122 0.118 0.119 0.12 0.111 
Notes: Table 7b reports the two stage system GMM regression result with Windmeijer – 
corrected standard errors and orthogonal deviation. All regressions are conducted 
using dynamic panel data estimation. The dependent variable is AIQ and is 
measured here as DLLA. Cross-border banking is measured as a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 where the shareholding proportion of the local banks by 
foreign banks is 50% or more and 0 otherwise. Institutional quality is measured 
here by law quality and legislative quality. DNPL is measured by a value of one if 
the value for non-performing loan is missing and zero, if otherwise. The logarithm 
of total assets is employed as a proxy for bank size. Market share is measured by 
the loan market share of banks and leverage is leverage of banks. GDP growth 
accounts for the difference in economic development across countries. Inflation is 
the rate of inflation based on CPI. Higher values of banking freedom signify 
higher freedom from government controls. Higher scores of property rights 
indicate certainty of legal protection and limited expropriation risk. Capital 
stringency is regulatory capital requirement. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis, ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. The following diagnostic tests are reported: 
1 the instrument count 
2 number of banks used in the sample 
3 the F-test for joint significance of explanatory variables 
4 the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions of which the null hypothesis is 
that the instruments are exogenous 
5 the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals of which the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
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In relation to the other measure of AIQ, LLA in Tables 6b and 7a, property right 
increases discretional LLA hence poor AIQ in banks with high levels of transparency. 
These results do not support the argument that firms in countries with strong investor 
protections and high quality judicial systems reflect bad news in reported earnings 
numbers in a more timely fashion than in countries characterised by weak investor 
protections and low quality judicial systems. Again, firms in countries with strong public 
enforcement slow the recognition of good news in reported earnings numbers relative to 
firms in countries with weak public enforcement (Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). Also, 
with the inclusion of the property right variable, all but bureaucratic quality is significant 
and positive. Meaning, the legal protection on private property as well as the judicial 
efficiency in enforcing these laws brings about institutional quality and by so doing 
increasing AIQ. Cross-border banking was found to increase AIQ in terms of all the 
institutional quality measures except bureaucratic quality, as it was negative and 
significant. The coefficient on GDP growth remains unchanged [that is, significant and 
negative in banks with high-level of transparency (in Table 7a) and with banks operating 
in high levels of legislative quality (Table 6b)]. This means that GDP growth increases 
AIQ in countries with high legislative quality. 
4.3.3 Capital stringency 
The influence of regulatory capital stringency on AIQ is considered by including the 
capital regulatory index. In this regression, the baseline model is re-estimated by 
including the index ‘capital stringent’ as an additional explanatory variable. The results 
are shown in Tables 6a, 6b, 7a and 7b. Regulatory capital stringency is not significantly 
linked to AIQ, that is, loan loss provision in terms of bureaucratic quality, transparency 
(Table 6a), and legislative quality (Table 6b). However, in terms of law quality, capital 
stringency increases DLLP. On the second measure of AIQ, LLA in Tables 7a and 7b, 
with the inclusion of capital stringency, legislative quality lost its significance in 
explaining DLLA. Cross-border banking maintained its negative significance to LLA in 
terms of all four institutional quality variables. Capital stringency does not significantly 
influence DLLA in terms of all the institutional quality measures but bureaucratic quality 
which has a negative and significant effect. High regulatory capital requirements enable 
cross-border banks to less discretionally manage LLA and thereby providing high quality 
accounting information. The intension to engage in more or less earnings management is 
argued to be driven primarily by some underlying motives such as window dressing of 
financial reports prior to public offerings, to meet bonus targets in order to increase 
management compensation, to avoid violating debt contracts, to reduce regulatory cost or 
increase regulatory benefits (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
5 Conclusions 
This paper contributes to literature by analysing how cross-border banking and 
institutional quality perform in terms of producing reliable and quality accounting 
information of banks in African countries. We employ system GMM estimator to 
determine the financial reporting quality of cross-border banks and how the institutional  
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quality of the countries in which they are domiciled impacts on their reporting quality. 
This provides insights to standard setters on how certain firm specific characteristics and 
institutional quality variables impact on the reporting quality of cross-border banks. 
Specifically, banks with high levels of transparency increase AIQ as measured by DLLP 
and LLA. The results also show that banks in regimes with high legislative quality have 
better AIQ. Transparency and legislative quality help in establishing strong and reliable 
accounting information. There is no evidence to suggest that AIQ is less in banks that 
Cross-border into other countries. Thus, cross listing may improve accounting quality as 
cross listed firms may have some individual specific firm incentives and may still also be 
influenced by home country institutions. Moreover, cross-border banks that operate 
efficiently may not be the best candidates for takeovers and for that reason do not have 
enough motivation to manage earnings to mask their true performance and to portray a 
better picture than the actual case. 
The results are robust to necessary controls for bank specific characteristics such as 
size and the macroeconomic conditions in Africa. Furthermore, the results are proven 
when various regulatory initiatives that can obscure the impact of Cross-border banking 
and institutional quality on AIQ are controlled. There is evidence that property right 
increases AIQ measured by DLLP when banks have high levels of transparency. From 
the results banks in countries with developed equity markets, dispersed ownership 
structures, strong investor rights, and legal enforcement engage in less earnings 
management. However, in transparent regimes, property right decreases AIQ when 
measured by DLLA. Banking freedom does not have an effect on AIQ of banks in Africa. 
However, capital stringency increases AIQ in banks with high level of bureaucratic 
quality. This is because; the stringent regulatory requirements reduce the tendency for 
banks to want to manage earnings. 
The fact that Cross-border banking combined high institutional quality lead to high 
AIQ is a vital insight to standard setters on the role of strong institutions in 
informativeness of bank financial statements. Thus, regulators should consider providing 
the needed environments that will enable both domestic and cross-border banks to 
operate efficiently and effectively. 
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Notes 
1 A Cross-border bank is a bank with a commercial presence outside its home country, by way 
of at least one branch or subsidiary. Cross-border banks are considered to be foreign owned if 
they are controlled by a shareholder or group of shareholders from outside the licensing 
jurisdiction. Control over a bank can be exercised if an individual or entity holds more than 
50% of shares in a bank, subsidiary or branch. In case where there is no majority shareholder, 
the bank is still classified a foreign bank when a foreign minority shareholder has a controlling 
stake in the bank (Beck et al., 2014). For the purpose of this study cross-border bank is bank 
with commercial presence outside its home country. 
2 Since a large number of NPL observations are missing, we use the modified zero-order 
regression method suggested by Maddala (1977) for the estimation. This method substitutes a 
zero for missing value and adds an indicator variable coded one if the corresponding variable 
is missing. 
3 This is based on the coefficients from the first-stage regression. 
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4 Countries included in the analysis for Northern Region of Africa are Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, 
Sudan, and Tunisia; the Central African countries included are Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone and Uganda; while Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe are included for Southern 
African countries. 
5 There is no evidence of autoregressive properties in the dataset as one-year lag of loan loss 
provision is not strongly related to concurrent levels. This suggests that the previous year’s 
value is not a factor in estimating the current year dependent variable values of loan loss 
provision. The Hansen test is insignificant as shown by the p-values, suggesting the models do 
not suffer from over identification, while the F-test confirms the joint significance of the 
independent variables. The insignificant AR(2) means the null of no second order serial 
correlation cannot be rejected. 
